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September 8, 1989

Jerald c. Newman, Chairman
National Commission on Libraries and
Information Science
2001 Marcus Avenue, Suite N20
Lake Success, NY 11042
Dear Mr. Newman:
Upon my return from the IFI.A meetings in Paris, I received your
letter of 14 August, in which you dispute two references to NCLIS
in my Inaugural Address. I do not agree that either of those
remarks are in error, nor do I agree that either statement
constitutes "distortion" of fact.
A perusal of even the edited, blacked-out, transcript of NCLIS's
14 January 1988 meeting with a FBI representative reveals that
most of the NCLIS Commissioners who registered an opinion,
including you, accepted and approved of the FBI's Library
Awareness Program activities and of the Bureau's raison-d'etre
for that Program as well. Any other interpretation of NCLIS's
posture in that meeting strikes me as transparent dissembling.
I described NCLIS's approval of the program as "unnecessary" and
"outrageous." You may dispute that assessment if you wish, but
the facts are such that you cannot dispute the collective
( opinions and persuasions of NCLIS Commissioners, including your
I own, as set out in that transcript.
\

What is obvious and disheartening throughout the document is the
im licit notion that national secu ·
safe uards and ·
Amen
e some ow mutually exclusive tenets. Further,
there is evidence of a lac o compre ension regar ing how
scientific information and data are organized and used in this
country, or what constitutes sinister behavior in a U.S.
scientific library. Let me repeat what I have said before; were
I to accept the FBI's description of a potentially subversive
patron as one bearing a foreign name or having a foreign accent
who photocopies "a lot" or "steals" library materials, I would be
obliged to report a patron of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology's Research Information Center who I know holds a
security clearance and works on a contract for an intelligence
agency of the U.S. government. I would need also to report the
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names of a number of NIST scientists, statisticians,
mathematicians and engineers, plus some of NIST's Guest
Scientists, Engineers and Industrial Research Associates, as well
as assorted persons from private sector corporations who use
RIC's resources for their work. In sum, the FBI's assumptions
about the characteristics of suspicious patrons of scientific
libraries are seriously flawed. It is most unfortunate that not
a single NCLIS Commissioner ever once questioned those
assumptions. Instead, NCLIS appears to have embraced them whole
cloth and without examination.
Moreover, some of us believe that an unstated objective of the
FBI's Library Awareness Program was and is to use the staffs of
America's scientific libraries to identify persons who can later
be "turned" by the FBI to become double agents. The FBI has
been less than candid regarding this matter, and NCLIS has done
nothing of record to inquire whether or not this is, in fact,
part of the Bureau's strategy. How can the Commission be trusted
to realistically or correctly advise the President and the
Congress on matters pertaining to America's scientific libraries
when it fails to recognize the possibility and implications of a
scenario like this one?
Since 1949, I have held U.S. government security clearances. I
know quite well what precautions and responsibilities are assumed
when one holds a clearance. Therefore, you will not be
surprised to learn that I was dumfounded when, upon reading the
transcript, I discovered that you convened a meeting which
produced what former NCLIS Deputy Executive Director David Hoyt
later called "sensitive and classified" information in the
San Antonio Public Library, an uncleared, public area which
appears to have been unswept as well. This must have been the
case, because the obligatory statements regarding the security
level of the meeting area and the security level of the
discussion is missing from both the beginning and the end of the
transcript. Yet, David Hoyt's letter of 19 February 1988 to Toby
Mcintosh cites two sections of 5USC as reasons why "sensitive and
classified" sections of the transcript of that San Antonio
meeting in the Public Library were "blacked out by the FBI." God
help the U.S. government if either intelligence sources or
intelligence methods were discussed or identified in that
meeting.
From the foregoing, I am sure it is clear that I believe if any
person or entity has public explaining to do, that entity is
NCLIS. More precisely, you as NCLIS Chairman owe the library
profession a public explanation.
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As to my reference to the Khomeini's act of terrorism -- the
Ayatollah called for the death of Salman Rushdie, the destruction
of his book and all who assisted him or promoted his volume on 16
February 1989. Between 17 and 28 February, library associations,
book publishers, several book sellers, reporters, editorial
writers, cartoonists, librarians, library educators, library
students and library staffs throughout the country staged
demonstrations or took to the airwaves, the TV and the newspapers
to denounce the Khomeini's actions. In addition, many library
schools and libraries held read-ins of Satanic Verses to
demonstrate publicly their support of Rushdie to write what he
chooses without being threatened with murder. Within the first
two weeks after 16 February, such groups and individuals had
publicly rejected -- at some peril to themselves -- the
Khomeini's threats to kill and to censor.
I said in Dallas and I say again that I "find it sad, shocking
and a matter of concern" that NCLIS chose not to react at the
time "Khomeini called for international censorship, book burning
and murder." Frankly, delivering a statement to a select few in
the relatively safe confines of a U.S. Senate hearing room one
month and one day after such an abhorrent incident occurred does
not, in my opinion, satisfy the obvious need for both timely,
responsible leadership and an immediate public statement
addressing the matter.
Taken together, these events cause me to doubt NCLIS's ability to

!

I function either effectively or credibly as an "honest broker,"

!much less as a national leader, on library and information
science matters.
I had seen the 19 July Washington Post article you included with
your letter. I must say, however, I do not understand why you
sent it. You are aware, I trust, that 37USC, which stipulates
the conditions under which U.S. patents are granted, provides for
their public disclosure and release and denies their issuance if
the proposed device, compound, etc., has been described
previously anywhere in the world's published literature. For
this reason, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office spends
considerable money each year acquiring copies of foreign patents
and accessing and translating foreign publications in a host of
relevant fields. A chief method of acquiring foreign patents and
foreign literature is by instituting patent and literature
exchange agreements between the United States and other
countries, including Eastern Bloc countries and the PRC.
I do hope your inclusion of that article was not meant to imply
that the FBI should continue its attempts at counterintelligence
in the library stacks. Even a casual perusal of U.S. patent law
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should dispel the notion that the theft of unclassified patents
has an intelligence-related basis. Ill-gotten profits may well
be a motive behind such thefts, but advancing the Soviet's
capabilities to build better MIGs is not. For the record,
37CFR1.ll provides specifically that
"After a patent has been issued or a
statutory invention registration has been
published, the specification, drawings and
all papers relating to the case in the file
are open to inspection by the public, and
copies may be obtained upon paying the fee
therefore."
That is, not only the patent document but all its accompanying
papers are released to the public. Further, 35USC181 restricts
inspection of certain patents and their files if their disclosure
"might be detrimental to the national security," to only
"responsible representatives authorized by a (defense) agency."
Such patents are not made available to the public in any format.
It is imperative, I believe, that NCLIS Commissioners
distinguish between the FBI's two sets of responsibilities,
namely, their responsibilities as police officers charged with
investigating interstate crime on the one hand and their
responsibilities as intelligence agents, charged with executing
certain counterintelligence functions in CONUS on the other.
The patent thefts fall in their first area of responsibility but
it is their second area of responsibility which gave rise to the
Library Awareness Program and ultimately, to our dispute.
Having served as the Director of both classified and open
scientific libraries in and out of government for over 35 years,
and as a former Deputy Chief Librarian of the Patent and
Trademark Office's Scientific Library, I very much hope that you
and your NCLIS colLeagues will be sensitive to these differences.
My husband, who has read the NCLIS/FBI transcript and who is a
retired Air Force Intelligence Officer and a Life Member of the
Association of Former Intelligence Officers, shares my concern in
this regard. We believe President George Bush, who is also a
Life Member of AFIO, would agree.
t I
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P.S. I too enclose a copy of an article from a recent issue of
the Washington Post, which points up a circumstance central to
science and technology today, namely, more often than not,
research in a given field proceeds simultaneously in several
parts of the world. In the case of the vacuum microelectronics
technology the article describes, work goes on in the U.S.,
Japan, Great Britain and the Soviet Union -- and I am quite
certain that the past and future advances in this field will be
reported in the open literature of all these countries. Let me
illustrate. Since September, 1986, a member of my staff has run
online searches monthly to determine how many times an article
announcing a joint NIST/Israeli discovery has been cited by
other scientists. From 1 January - 14 August 1989, that article
was cited 167 times in articles on further developments prepared
by other scientists; 55 (33%) of those articles appeared in
foreign journals. Since not all foreign or U.S. scientists
choose to publish in their own country, I checked the numbers of
scientists residing and working in other countries who
contributed to those 167 articles. The total was 118, 37 of
which reside in either Eastern Bloc countries or the PRC and 81
of which reside in countries we consider to be our allies -- or
at least not our enemies at the moment.
In sum, the United States is not now and has not been for some
time a world leader in many scientific areas. This is not to say
we are not ahead in inventing and discovering. What we fail to
do well today, however, is to convert those inventions and
discoveries into useful, marketable products and technologies.
This circumstance has little to do with our nation's enemies or
even our nation's friends. Rather, it results from U.S.
industry's greater interest in the buy-out and the takeover than
in funding long-term R&D or taking risks in new markets. It has
to do with a semi-literate work force and a scientifically
illiterate public, 94% of whom think DNA is a food additive and
Chernobyl is a ski resort. Equally serious, it has to do with
those past and present Congresses who destroyed or refuse now to
restore industry's incentives to invest in this country's longterm prosperity. The FBI can't remedy these maladies, nor can
NCLIS or ALA -- that is, none can do it alone. It is important,
however, for all to understand the real bases for many of our
present scientific difficulties.
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